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ABSTRACT 
Recent work  demonstrates that dynastic assumptions gtarantee the 
irrelevance of all  redistributional  policies,  distortionary taxes,  and 
prices——the neutrality of fiscal policy (Ricardian equivalence) is only 
the "tip of the  iceburg.'  In this paper, we investigate the possibility 
of reinstating approximate Ricardian equivalence by introducing  a small 
amount of  friction in intergenerational links.  If  Ricardian equivalence 
depends  upon significantly  snorter  chains of links  than do  these 
stronger  neutrality results, then friction may dissipate the effects 
that generate strong neutrality, without significantly affecting the 
Ricardian result.  Although this intuition turns out to be essentially 
correct, we show that models with small amounts of friction have other 
untenable implications.  We conclude that the  theoretical  case for 
Ricardlan equivalence remains tenuous. 
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In recent years, Robert Barro's [1974]  version  of "Ricardian 
equivalence" has stimulated much controversy  concerning the effects of 
government  budget deficits and social  security programs.  In his well— 
known paper, Barro supplented  the  traditional  overlapping  generations 
model with intergenerational  altruism, and argued, in essence, that 
voluntary transfers  between parents and children cause the represen- 
tative family to behave as though it is a single, infinite—lived 
individual——a "dynastic"  unit.  From the  point of view of the family, 
neither debt nor social security alters  available alternatives; both are 
therefore  neutral.  Thus,  Barro's analysis identifies the strength of 
intergenerational  altruism as a key factor in determining tne effects of 
government bond issues and public  pension programs. 
Recently,  Bernheim  and  Bagwell  [1988]  have  argued against the 
applicability  of Ricardian equivalence by  demonstrating that Barro's 
assumptions guarantee the  irrelevance  of all redistributional  policies, 
distortionary  taxes,  and prices——the  neutrality of fiscal policy is only 
the "tip of the iceburg."  Their results rely on the existence of 
intrafamily linkages, which  arise whenever two unrelated individuals 
produce a common child,  Bernheim and Eagwell concluded that,  since 
these other propositions do not hold even  approxirrately,  one cannot 
assert that the world is approximately dynastic.  Accordingly,  all 
conclusions following from the dynastic framework (including  Ricardian 
equivalence) are suspect. 
Bernheim and Bagwell also  noted that it might  be  possible to reinstate  approximate Ricardian equivalence without generating untenable 
consequences  by  introducing a  small  amount of  friction'.  Intuitively, 
friction would cumulate with each link and  would become  substantial for 
long chains.  Since  Ricardian equivalence (for debt  redeemed within a 
few  generations)  presumably  depends on short chains while  the  Bernheim— 
Bagwell results  presurrably depand on long  ones  (we  note that these 
presumptions may be erroneous——see section  7),  the introduction of 
friction mit just  do the  trick, 
The purpose of this paper is  to evaluate the preceding argument by 
formally introduciing  various forms  of friction into a model with 
altruistically motivated intergenerational  transfers.  We focus on 
frictions  arising from three sources:  the derivation of pleasure 
directly from the act of giving;  incomplete  information  about others' 
preferences;  and egalitarian social  norms that constrain parents to 
divide transfers  evenly between children.  The first two sources of 
friction turn out to be quite similar analytically, and give rise to 
qualitatively similar results,  In particular,  one can obtain 
approxite  Ricardian equivalence by introducing a sufficiently small 
amount of  friction.  Furthermore, for any given amount of friction, one 
can reinstate the relevance of other redistributional  policies by taking 
the population to be sufficiently large  (it follows from this that taxes 
will distort behavior, and  prices will play an important allocational 
role).  However, there is a hitch:  by  simultaneously  taking friction to 
be snll and population  to be large,  one drives each  individual's 
marginal propensity to consume out of wealth to zero.  In resolving —3-. 
several  paradoxes posed by Bernheim  and gwell, one therefore  merely 
encoiters another. 
The introduction of elitarian constraints generates  some 
intruiging results.  Most  importantly,  one obtains exact Ricardian 
equivalence  in a  world where other redistributional  policies have 
significant  allocative  effects.  Since  there is no need to assume that 
this  source of friction is "small,"  one does not encounter the own— 
wealth  effect puzzle noted above.  We are troubled however by the 
rather  ad hoc nature of this constraint.  In addition, its imposition 
generates  a new paradox:  we show that  an exogenous increase in the 
wealth of any given individual  is never Pareto improving.  Consequently, 
we conclude that the theoretical  case for Ricardian  equivalence remeins 
tenuous even when one explicitly recognizes  sources of economic 
friction. 
We ornize our  discussion  as follows.  Section 2 lays out the 
basic model,  cescribes an appropriate notion of equilibrium, and 
presents some technical results which facilitate the analysis of 
subsequent sections.  In sections 3 through 6 we consider, respectively, 
specialized cases in which a) there  is no friction, b) altruists derive 
utility in part directly from the act of giving,  c) agents  have 
incomplete information  about each others'  preferences, and d) parents 
are constrained to divide transfers  equally between their children. 
Section 7 contains some concluding  remarks.  We defer all technical 
manipulations  and  proofs  to the appendices.  Appendix A contains a 
complete  treatment  of  comparative  statics for cases b and c above, while —4— 
Appendix B treats case d.  We present proofs of specific results in 
Appendix C. 
2.  The  Model 
We  ccnsider an economy comprised of 2N households.  Despite the 
fact that we treat  each household  as if it consists of a single 
individual,  one  should for the purpose of interpretation  think of 
households  as nErried couples.  The  population is evenly divided between 
two  groups  of households, henceforth referred to as  "parents"  and 
children,"  Thus,  there are  N  parents (labelled  p., i =  1,...,N), 
and  N  children (labelled  k., i = 1,... ,N),  Eve parent  has  two 
children,  and every child has two parents (reflecting  the fact that 
spouses originally come from different households).  We assume in 
particular that  p's  children are  k  and  k1  (where,  by 
convention, kNl 
= kj.  It is therefore  appropriate to think of 
intrafamily  relations as a kind of circle (pictured  in figure 1), 
consisting of an outer layer (parents)  and an inner layer (children). 
This representation  of intrafamily relations is unquestionably 
highly stylized, and does not reflect the full complexity of family 
networks, particularly in cases where  these networks span more than two 
generations (see Bernheim and Bagwell  [1986]).  On the other hand, this 
framework has  the advantage of rendering our current analytic objectives 
tractable, while  in all  likelihood doing  very little violence  to the 
underlying economic issues.  We  return  to  this point in section 7,  and 
argue  that more realistic modelling of family  networks would only tend 
to strengthen our conclusions. —5— 
Parent  is endowed with wealth, W  similarly, child  is 
endowed with  w.  Parent  P.  divides his wealth between consumption 
(Ci, a  transfer to  child  k  (T), and a transfer to child  k  (tj,  1  1  1  1+1  1 
C.  =  —  T.  — t.  1  1  1  1 
subject,  of course, to non—netivity constraints  (C.  > 0,  T.  >  0, 
t.  >  0).  Child  i  receives  transfers from  parents  p  and  p1 
(where,  by  convention,  p  p1),  and  consumes  all available resources 
C.  =  w.  +  T.  +  t.  1  1  1  i1 
We  suppose that children are completely selfish,  so that the well- 
being of child  k.  is given by 
u.  = u(c.) 
With probability  It,  parent  is also completely selfish, so that his 
well being is given by 
= u(Ci 
(note that the felicity function for parents  is identical  to that for 
children——this restriction is inessential).  With probability 
(1 — it),  parent  p.  is altruistic; this entails non—paternalistic 
altruism for his child (as  in Frro [1974]),  and possibly some concern 
for the  magnitude of his bequests (as in Andreoni [1986]): 
=  u(C.)  + [u(c,) + u(c.1)} 
+ m[v(T.)  + v(tj] —6— 
(a, > 0).  For simplicity,  we assume that the  random events that 
determine parental preferences  are distributed independently  over 
parents.  Throughout, we also assuma that  u()  and  v()  are twice 
continuously differentiable  and strictly concave. 
The final allocation of resources is determined through  a 
simultaneous move game,  in which each parent chooses his own 
consumption, as well as intergenerational transfers.  Each parent's 
preferences are private information; while parent  p.  knows whether or 
not he  himself is altruistic,  his fnformation concerning others is 
limited to owledge of the distribution of preferences  described 
above.  It is therefore  necessary to employ a solution concept that 
allows for incomplete information.  The natural choice is to focus 
attention on Eayesian Nash Eauilibria (see Harsanyi [1967—68]). 
In a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (hencefort  BNE),  we  assign  to  each 
parent a function mapping his preferences into decisions.  These 
decisions m.st maximize his expected utility given  associated 
preferences, and given the distribution of other  parents' decisions 
induced by  their assigned  fLmctions.  In the current context, a  BNE  has 
a particularly  simple form.  When  parent  i  is selfish, he will 
obviously  set 
T1, 
t.  = 0,  rerdless  of what other rents  do.  Thus, 
we need  only describe the  choices, (Tt1) which are contingent  upon 
*  *N 
parent  I  being altruistic.  Accordingly, (T.,t.)i1 
is a BNE if for 
all  i,  (T,t)  solves —7— 
(3)  max  u(W.  - T.  - t,)  + (1  - .)[u(w.  + T. + t )  +  u(w.  + T  + t) 
T  t  1  1  1  1  1  x—1  i+1  i+1 
i' i 
+ Iu(w.  +  T,)  +  u(w  + t)]} + a[v(T  )  +  v(t  )j  1  1  i+1  1  i  I 
(subject  to  non—negativity  constants).  We note in passing that when  it 
equals either 3  or  1  (so that information  is complete),  this 
definition  reduces to the sore standard notion of  a Nash equilibrium. 
Throughout  much  of  our analysis,  we will  assume  that resources  are 
initially  distributed  evenly  within generations.  That  is, 
W, =W 
1 
w  = w 
1 
fcr all  i.  When  we assume  symmetric endowments,  we will also focus 
attention  on symmetric  equilibria,  which have the property that the 
magnitudes  of all transfers  (conditional upon the parent being 
*  *  * 
altruistic)  are  identical  (i.e., T. = t.  = T  for all  i 
1  1 
We now present  three technical  results which justify the 
comparative statics  performed in subseqnt sections.  The first of 
these establishes  existence. 
Theorem 1:  For all endowment profiles (W,w.)  ,  a  BNE exists. 
1  1 i1 
Next,  we show  that  symmetric  equilibria  do indeed exist when 
endowments  are symmetric. 
Theorem  2:  If endowments  are distributed  symmetrically,  then 
* 
there exists  a symmetric  BNE.  Furthermore,  the associated  transfer,  T is independent  of  N. 
The second portion of this result establishes that the  allocation of 
resources is in some  important sense independent of population size. 
This conolusion wIll feature prominently in the ensuing analysis. 
Finally,  we  establish a  iqueness result. 
Theorem 3:  If  a  > 0  or  it  >  0,  then  there  is a  unique  BNE.  If 
a  = 0  and  a =  0, 
When  altruism  is  imperfect  (a  or  it  positive), equilibrium is unique. 
In particular, we lose nothing at all by focusing on symmetric 
equilibria for the case of symmetric endowments.  In a frictionless 
world, there mey indeed  be a multiplicity of equilibria (more  on this 
later), but all  such equilibria  are equivalent, so once ain  our 
analysis involves no  loss of generality. 
Throughout  the  following sections,  we  will  focus on interior 
equilibria  (i.e.,  parents meke positive transfers to their children). 
Since we will be priuarily  concerned with environments that are  "almost" 
symmetric and frictionless, it is sufficient to assume that 
u'(W)  < u'(w) 
As a final preliminary  step, we describe two types of "fiscal" 
policies of particular interest.  The first of these  corresponds to the 




for all  i.  That is,  the government redistributes  resources from the 
younger generation to the older generation, presunbly  by deferring 
taxes into the  future.  Note that this experiment is a pure case of 
intergenerational redistributIon, since all members of the same 
generation are affected identically. 
- 
The  second  type of fiscal policy considered here amounts  to a  pure 
redistributions  within the parents'  generation.  In particular, . 
represents  a  transfer to  parent  p, financed  out of "general  revenues' 
dW.  I  if ji 
d. 
1  —1/(N  — 1)  otheraise 
It would also be natural to analyze a third type of OliC 
consisting of redistributions within the  children's generation. 
Analytically, such policies are extremely similar to redistributions 
within the parent's generation, so we do not consider them explicitly. 
Note that,  taken together, these three sets of instruments are 
comprehensive, in the sense that they allow the governrint to achieve 
any conceivable distribution of resources. 
Throughout the rest of this paper, we focus on the extent to which 
fiscal instruments redistribute consumption in equilibrium.  For each 
policy  p  (where  p  is either public debt,  5, or an intragenerational 
transfer, tj, we  define a distributional  index: —10— 
N  dC  dc. 
=  (Ii 
+ 
j  =1 
The  logic of this index is straightforward.  If the policy  p  has no 
effect on the consumption of any individual, then  R  =  0.  Thus, 
0  corresponds to the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis,  and 
R 1  =  for all  i  corresponds to the Rernheim—Bagwell  neutrality 
proposition.  Note also that,  in  the absence of operative 
intergenerational linkages, for each of the policies described  - 
above,  R  =-  1  (redistributing  endowments leads to a one—for—one 
redistribution of  consumption).  Thus,  a iue of  R  between  0  and 
1  tells us  how  closely behavior conforms  to each of  the polar cases. 
3,  Perfect Aitni 
We begin by  considering  a frictionless world, in which  altruism is 
perfectly nonpaternalistic  (a  =  =  0).  Since such environrnts have 
received  much prior attention  (see rro [1974] and  Bernheim  and  gwell 
[1988]),  this section contains no new  results as such.  Rather,  we 
restate known neutrality  results  within  the context  of our current model 
in order to provide  a  "base case"  with which  to compare the results of 
subsequent sections. 
Under the assumptions  specified in section 2,  an interior 
equilibrium  nust satisfy 
(4A)  u(C)  = u(c) 
(4B)  u(C.)  = u(c) —11— 
where 
*  *  * 
C  =L  —T. —t 
1  1  1  i 
and 
*  *  * 
c.  =  w.  + T,  +  t.  1  1  1  i—I 
for  all  i.  Given our concavity  assumptions, these conditions  are also 
sufficient to establish an equilibrium.  Note that (4A),  (4B),  (5A), and 
(58)  form a system of 4N equations in 4N unknowns.  Ordinarily,  one 
would think that the system would be fully determined.  However, brief 
inspection reveals that one of the equations given in (4A) and  (48)  is 
redundant (recall that 
0N1 
S 01).  Thus, the system is under— 
determined. 
This does  not,  however, reflect real  indeterrniriancy  of  resource 
allocation.  To see  this,  we  sum  (5A) and  (58)  over  i  to  obtain 
*  * 
(C.  +  c.  —  w.  —  w. )  =  o 
1  1  1  1 
Note  that (4A),  (4B),  and (6) (omitting  the  redundant equation) form a 
system of 2N equations in 2N unknoms.  Accordingly, it seems likely 
that consumption is fully determined.  In fact,  we have already 
established that there is a  a-uique solution to this system of equations 
(Theorem 3). 
In contrast,  transfers are  indeterminant.  To understand this 
point, refer ain to figure 1.  Suppose that an equilibrium prevails. 
If every  parent simply increases  T.  by  $1  and decreases  t  by  $1, —12— 
the  allocation of real resources retrains unchanged.  Thus,  the new 
profile of transfers is also an equilibrium.  Equilibrium  transfers  are 
therefore defined only up to an additive constant, with the sole 
restriction that all transfers sist be positive. 
Accordingly, we ny ignore transfers completely,  and describe the 
equilibrium  consumption profile directly through equations (4A),  (4B), 
and  (6),  Simple  inspection  of these  equations reveals that the 
allocation of resources  depends  only upon total wealth, 
N 
]  (W.  + 
i=1 
Changes in  the distribution of wealth have no effect on the  consumption 
of any individual. 
Several neutrality results follow immediately  from this 
observation.  We begin with rro's [1974]  well—iciown  version of 
Ricardian equivalence: 
Propositioni:  If  a=it=O, then  5  =0. 
The proof simply  consists of noting that 
+ wj) = 0 
and invoking the preceding observations. 
Bernheis  and Bagwell [1988]  have criticized rro's  analysis on 
two  grounds.  First, they  argue that,  in a world with intrafamily 
linkages, rro'  s assumptions (perfect non—çaternalistic altri.iism —13— 
coupled with operative transfers) imply that all redistributional 
policies are neutral.  In the current context,  we obtain 
Proposition 2:  if  5  =  = 0,  then  R  0  for all  i 
This result follows directly from the observation that 
(i (.  + ))  =  0 
3  i1 
analogously  to Proposition 1. 
Proposition 2  indicates that policies that redistribute  resources 
beten apparently  unrelated  members  of the same  generation have  no 
effects on resource allocation.  Using this result, one can also show 
that,  in somewhat  more  elaborate environments, apparently  distortionary 
taxes  have no  effects  on behavior,  and  that prices are not only 
indeterminate,  but also play no role in the resource allocation  process 
see  Bernheim and gwell  [1988]  and Bernheim [1986]). 
Bernheim  and Bagwell also offered, but did not emphasize,  a second 
criticism of the dynastic framework:  as the population size increases, 
each individual's merginal propensity to consume out of his own wealth 
falls to zero.  As we shall see,  this observation turns  out to be 
particularly important in models that incorporate small amounts  of 
friction,  in the  current context, we have 
* 
dC. 
Proposition  3:  If  a =  =  0,  lim  = 0  for all  I. 
N-  i 
To establish Proposition 3,  we argue as  follows.  8y  Proposition  2 
(along  with a similar result  for children), equalizing the  distribution —14- 
of resources within generations has no effect on consumption.  Thus,  we 
can invoke  Theorem 3,  to conclude that the distribution of consumption 
is symmetric both before  and after the incremental infusion of wealth. 
It is trivial to check that  C (s C  for all  i)  and  c  (a c  for 
1  1 
all  i)  are both increasing in aggregate resources.  Thus, 
dC./dW.  < i/N,  from which the result follows immediately. 
Empirically speaking, Proposition  2 (along  with its corollaries) 
and Proposition 3 are both  untenable,  Indeed,  since these properties do 
not hold even as an approximation in the  raal. world, eality is  in  dome 
critical sense not even approximately like the model described here. 
Accordingly, rnheim  and gwell  conclude that it is inapropriate to 
take the Ricardian equivalence  result even as a  "rule of  thumb" guide  to 
policy,  without first specifying the nature of the approximation in 
great detail.  We  undertake this task in subsequent sections, 
4.  Joy  of Giving 
in this section we analyze the case in which all  parents  are 
altruistic and, in addition,  care directly  about the size of the 
transfers they aeke.  Formally, a > 0  and  m = 0.  Parent  i  chooses 
the transfers  T1  and  t  to satisfy 
(7A)  u'(C.) = u'(c.) + av'(T) 
(7E)  u'(C1) 
= u'(c.1) 
+ av'(t) 
In deciding on the optimal transfers,  parent i considers reducing his 
owr consumption, C,  by one unit.  If he transfers this unit to child —15— 
1,  the parent's utility is increased by  u'(c) 
+ mv'(Tj; if he 
transfers this unit of  consumption good to child  i + 1,  then the 
parent's utility is increased by  u'(c11) 
+ av'(t.).  The first—order 
conditions (7A) and  (7B)  show that a  consumer chooses  T1  and  t  so 
that the  rrarginal utility loss from decreasing his own consumption  is 
equal to the nBrginal utility in  from increasing either  T 
or  t.. 
To obtain comparative static results for this model,  one 
differentiates the entire system formed  by equations (7A) and (7B)  (for 
each  i), along  with the budget constraints.  The  following  result is 
extremely helpful for evaluating the effects of specific policy 
exercises. 
Theorem 4:  If  it  =  0,  >  0,  and  the initial distribution of 
endowments is symmetric, then 
= j-k  +  -  - X)  ) 
v(T)  + u"(c) 
where  X  solves 
—1  v"(T)  v"(T)  [av"(Tfl2  X  =  2[1  + u"(c) 
+ u"(C) 
+ u"(C)u"(c) 
Since the  formula for  X  is quadratic, there are, of course, two 
solutions.  Given the nature of  this formula, one root is simply the 
inverse of the  of the other.  If  a ) 0, then the expression on the 
right hand side  strictly exceeds 2, so that one  solution exceeds unity, —16— 
while  the other lies beeen  C  and  1,  It is easy to check that the 
value  of  dC/dW  does not depend upon whether one uses the larger  or 
k 
smaller root.  For convenience, we henceforth  adopt the convention that 
0  < X < 1. 
Now consider the effects of a Ricardian redistribution in which 
is increased by one unit and  w is decreased by one unit for all 
i.  It is of course feasible for all  C and  c  to remain unchanged 
in the face of this experirint,  However, this inriance of consumption 
is not,  in general,  optimal as argued  below. 
- 
Suppose  that  all  parents  intain their  own consumption  unchanged 
and  increase  T1  and  t 
each by 1/2,  In this case all  c.  will  be 
mchanged.  However, the first—order  conditions (7A) and  (7B)  will fail 
to  be satisfied because the  increase in transfers  leads  to a  reduction 
in  av'(T.) and  av'(t).  Therefore, the narginal utility of parent i's 
consumption, u'(Ci),  would exceed the right—hand sides of (7A) and  (7B), 
which represent the  narginal utility associated with an additional 
transfer.  To re—establish optimality,  parent i would increase his own 
consumption and decrease his transfers.  Therefore,  the Ricardian 
experiment increases the consumption  of parents and reduces the 
consumption  of children. 
The argument  that consumption would not remain  unchanged in the 
face of  a  Ricardian experinnt ss based on  the fact that increased 
transfers  would reduce  av'(T1) 
and  av'(t.)  and  therefore violate  the 
first—order  conditions (7A) and (7B).  However, if  a  is srrll  then 
this effect will be small  and the impact  on consumption will be minimal. —17— 
Thus, we would expect the effect of deficits on consumption to be 
continuous in  a.  Likewise, one would expect to obtain a  similar 
continuity property with respect to the effect of transfer  policies on 
consumption.  Formelly, we have 
Proposition 4:  If  m  = 0  and  the initial distribution of 
6  i 
endowments is symmetric,  then  urn R  =  urn  R  = 0. 
a+0 
Proposition  4  tails  us that by  taking  friction to be small we can 
obtain both Ricardian  equivalence and  the stronger neutrality  properties 
as  arbitrarily good approximations.  By itself, this result does not 
bolster the Ricardian position.  However, the key point is that for  ¶. 
the quality of the approximation depends  upon  N,  whereas for  &  it 
does not.  Indeed,  since  public debt does  not alter the symmetry of 
a 
endowments,  then by Theorem 2  R  is completely independent of  N.  In 
contrast,  R  '  varies with systematically with  N. 
In  keeping with the intuition given in the introduction to this 
paper, we wish to explore the behavior of  R  as  N  becomes very 
large.  We  therefore consider in detail the effect of  t.  on  the 
1 
distribution of  consumption in large economies.  Note that  dC/d 
is 
the sum of tao components:  (1)  the direct effect of the increase in 
parent is  wealth, dC/dW; and (2) the effect on parent  l's 
consumption of the reduction  in parent j's wealth  by  (N 
—  1)1  units, 
for all  j  i.  To evaluate these components in a large  economy, we 
take the limit of the formula given in Theorem 4 (recalling that,  since 
endowments  are symmetric, C, ,  and  T  do not depend on  N): —18— 
dC* 
=  X)1  (2 + 
Thus,  an  increase in  Wk  has a positive effect on  C.  but the 
magnitude of the effect declines geometrically  as  j—k increases—— 
friction dissipates the effect on more distant relatives.  We depict 
this pattern graphically in figure 2. 
Consider now the  tao component effects of  ..  For  a large 
economy, the effect on parent j's wealth is negligible.  Indeed, it 
follows from Theorem 4 that even summing over all  j  I,  there is no 
effect on arent  i's consumption (i.e.  effect (ii)  above is eaual to 
zero).  Intuitively, in large  economies almost all  j  are only 
distantly related to  i, so that the friction in any chain linking  j 
to  i  almost completely dissipates the effects of changes in j's 
wealth.  Thus,  In a large  economy, the effect on parent i's consumption 
of the  redistributive transfer  'r•  is the same as the effect on parent 
i's consumption of an increase In parent  l's wealth (effect (i) above). 
Inspection of Theorem 4 reveals that,  even in a large  economy, dC/dW1 
is positive.  This follows from the fact that if parent  i  received an 
additional ixit of wealth and did not increase his own consumption, then 
he would increase his transfers 
T1 
and 




In this case,  the rrrginal utility of his own 
consumption, u'(C1), 
would exceed the right—hand sides of the  first— 
order conditions (7A) and (7B).  In order to satisfy the first—order 
conditions, parent  i  would increase his own consumption. —19— 
Finally, since the  effects of wealth injections are localized, in 
large economies we would expect  to redistribute consumption from 
the general population to the close relatives  of  1,  so that in  the 
limit  R 
1  + 1.  We sumrxarize  these conclusions in Proposition  5. 
Proposition 5:  If  t = C, a >  0, and the  initial distribution 
of endowments is symmetric, then  lim  = 1.  Furthermore, 
dC*  dC* 
I  .  I  lim —  lim —  >  0. 
dc.  dW. 
N--  i  N 1  - 
Taken  together,  Propositions  4 and 5 may well appear to resolve 
the difficulties raised by Bercheim and Bagwell.  Specifically, one can 
obtain Ricardian equivalence to an arbitrarily good approximation by 
taking  a  sufficiently small.  If for a given  a  the population is 
sufficiently large  then,  as in a model with no altruistic linkages, a 
one dollar intragenerational transfer will redistribute one dollar of 
I 
consumption in equilibrium  (i.e.  P 
1 
1).  The recipient of such a 
transfer will act as  though  he has received  an  injection of new wealth—— 
that is,  he will completely ignore the fact that the governrrent acquired 
these  resources  by levying taxes on individuals to whom the recipient is 
operatively linked.  Taking the  population to be large does not, 
however, affect the approximate validity  of Ricardian  equivalence,  Thus, 
with  a  small and  N  large relative  to  a1, deficits are approximately 
neutral,  but intragenerational redistributions  are not.  Formally, we 
have —20— 
Eroposition 6:  There exists  a decreasing  function  N  such  that 
for  any sequence  <ak,N>kl 
with  ha  (ak,Nk) 
=  (0,)  and 
Nk  Ok)  for all  k, lim R  =  0  and  Urn R  = 1.  -  k- 
Note that one  does not obtain  + 0  and  R' +  I  for all 
sequences  (ak,Nk)  (o,).  Nk 
must be sufficiently large  for each 
for the argument to work.  More generally, (a,,N,)  + (o,) 
¶ 
consistent with any limiting value for  R ', including  0.  Thus,  one 
cannot justify Ricardian equivalence  simply by arguing that friction is 
small and the population is large.  However, the logical puzzle  posed  by 
Bernheim and gwehl  appears  for the moment  to be mitigated.  It seems 
that one  must turn to  empirical evidence in order to determine whether 
the actual values of  a  and  N  are  consistent with approximate 
Ricardian equivalence, but inconsistent with the collateral neutrality 
results. 
Yet this resolution is unsatisfactory.  if one simultaneously 
takes  a  small (so that Ricardian equivalence is approxirrtely true) 
and  N  large (so that intragenerational transfers  remain  relevant), 
then in  the limit each individual's  consumption  is necessarily unrelated 
to  his own wealth.  More precisely, 
Proposition 7:  Suppose  a = 0,  and that the  initial distribution 
of endowments is symmetric.  Let  < 
0k'  Nk > 
be such that 
lim 
(ak,Nk) 
=  (o,).  Then —21— 
* 
dC. 
urn  = 
k+  1 
Thus,  by introducing friction through  5, one  cannot  simultaneously 
resolve  the  difficulties  raised  by  Propositions  2  and  3  of  section  3: 
if one  takes  friction to be  small without  letting the population get 
very large,  then in the limit everything  is  neutral; if one  takes 
friction to be small while letting the  population grow,  then in the 
limit each individuals marginal propensity  to consume  out of wealth 
falls  to zero. 
Propositions 6  and  7  may  at  first  appear  to  be  inconsistent. 
Suppose  we take  some sequence  (ak,Nk) 
-*  (O,)  with  N.  > N(z) 
for 
each  k.  Sy proposition 7, we know that in the limit consumption does 
not depend upon  an individual's own alth.  This seems to imply that 
consumption depends upon aggregate wealth, from which it would follow 
that all redistributive policies  are neutral.  Quite to the contrary, 
proposition 6 tells us that  R  1.  The key to this puzzle is the 
fact that,  in the  limit, consumption  is a function of local  aggregates, 
rather than global aggregates.  That is,  the consumption of individual 
i  depends only upon the wealth holdings of is close" relatives.  In 
the  limit, i  has an infinite number of close realtives (even though 
these relatives form a negligible subset of the entire population), and 
so i's own wealth is irrelevant.  However, a redistribution of one 
dollar from  i  to  j  (where  I  and  j  are only very  distantly 
related)  will transfer one dollar of consumption from  i  and his close 
relatives to  j  and  his  close relatives. —22— 
In summary, we find that one  can simultaneously take friction 
small  (a  -*  0)  and population large  (N - )  such  that Ricardian 
equivalence holds arbitrarily well, and  such  that redistrjbutions have 
real effects (changes in wealth only affect consumption  locally). 
However,  in doing so  one necessarily produces an untenable  result:  each 
individuals'  consumption  is unrelated  to his own  wealth. 
5.  Incowplete Inforation 
Now  consider an economy in which a fraction it  of  the parents are 
selfish and the retraining fraction 1  — it  of  the parents are altruistic. 
Each parent knows whether he is altruistic or selfish, and  knows  the 
fraction  it of selfish parents, but does not know whether any other 
particular parent is selfish or altruistic.  For simplicity,  we assume 
that there is no joy of giving motive (a  0). 
Rather than treat this case in detail, we will simply indicate its 
formal similarity to the joy of giving model.  Specifically, if  a > 0 
and  it  =  0,  the utility of each parent is given by 
(6)  u(C.)  + [u(y.)  + u(y.1)J 
+ a  [v(T.)  + v(tj] 
where 
C.  = W.  —  T  — t 
1  1  i  I 
and 
y.  =  w.  +  T.  ÷ t. 
1  1  1  —1 —23— 
Alternatively,  when  a = 0  and  it >  0, parent is  expected utility 
(given that  he is altruistic) reduces to 





(recall that,  with incomplete information, we interpret  T,  and  t,  as 
choices conditional upon  j  being altruistic, with the understanding 
that  j  transfers  nothing if he is completely selfish). 
We note four differences between (8) and (9).  First,  in (9) the 
second term is multiplied by  (1 — it).  Clearly,  this difference in 
scale can have no qualitative consequences, and even quantitative 
differences disappear as  it  goes  to  0.  Second, in (9)  the  third term 
is multiplied by  it  rather  than  .  Yet  both  it  and  a  are riasures 
of friction.  Merely changing the index is inconsequential.  Third, in 
(9)  u()  appears in place of  v().  Since we never ruled out the 
possibility that  u(s)  and  v()  are identical, this  too is 
irrelevant.  Finally, in (9)  w + T.  appears in place of  T 
(likewise  w.  + t.  in place of  t.).  Clearly, this cannot affect 
i+1  1  1 
comparative statics  for  the  instruments  t., since  w.  in independent 
of t  1 
Given  the strong  similarities between (8)  and  (9), it should not 
be surprising that formal analysis of  the  two  models is virtually 
identical.  We  therefore treat these  models simultaneously in Appendix  A 
by analyzing a  slightly  sore general  formulation that subsumas both 
specifications.  Since Appendix A gives a  complete  characterization of 
comparative statics for the general  formulation, it is possible  to —24- 
obtain direct analogs of Propositions  4  through 7  for  the case  of 
a  = 0,  it  >  0  by  mimicking the proofs in Appendix C.  We leave details 
to the interested reader. 
6. 
Despite its apparent promise, the  introduction of friction does 
not appear to resolve successfully all of the puzzles posed in  Bernheim 
and gwell's  analysis.  We now turn to a less obvious alternative, 
which 15 isotivated by the empirical obsertion  that testators often 
choose to divide bequests equally among their heirs (see Menchik 
- 
[1980]).  This phenornon  has puzzled previous analysts, in that it 
appears to contradict the  implications of all widely subscribed theories 
concerning bequest motives (see the discussion in rnheim, Shleifer and 
Summers [198]).  We offer no new explanation of equal division here, 
but rather simply assume that altruistic rents  rraximize utility 
subject to an elithrian constraint.  Like  the introduction of friction 
in section 4, the constraint itself is somewhat ad hoc,  but,  as we shall 
see, its introduction generates some intniiging implications.  We leave 
the task of justifying  the equal division  assumption for future work. 
Accordingly, we set  a = it  =  0,  and modify our basic model by 
assuming that parent  p.  maximizes utility subject to the constraint 
that 
t.  = T. 
1  1 
Formally,  Theorems I  through 3 do  not apply to this case.  We therefore —25— 
provide the following result: 
Theorem 5:  Suppose  a = it = 0,  and  that parents face egalitarian 
constraints.  For every endowment profile  there exists  a 
unique equilibrium.  Furthermore, if endowments are  distributed 
symmetrically, then the equilibrium is symmetric, and the associated 
* 
equilibrium  transfer,  T  ,  is irideendent of  N. 
As in section 4, it is useful to derive some preliminary 
comparative static  results that allow us to compute the effects of 
various policy experiments.  We therefore provide the  following theorem: 
Therem 6:  Suppose  a = it  = 0,  and that parents face egalitarian 
constraints.  Let initial endowments  be distributed symmetrically.  Then 
dC  —2\(1 + XN)_1(l  — N)_1(1 — X)1  for  j =  k 
k  (-kl + XN  3I)(1  + )(i — N)_1(1 — )_1  otherwise 
where  X  solves 
+X_1240) 
Once again, the  formula for  X  is quadratic.  Since the  right 
hand side is strictly less than  —2, one  solution is less than  —1, 
while the other lies beten  0  and  —1  (one is simply the reciprocal 
of the other).  For convenience, we choose the second root (both yield 
the same value of  dC/dWk) 
and adopt the convention that  0 > X > —1. 
We begin  our analysis of egalitarian altruism by noting that —26— 
Ricaran equivalence holds  exactly (i.e., not approximately, as in  the 
preceding sections).  To  establish  this property,  we  need not assume 
that endowments are distributed symmetrically——the  result  obtains even 
when  the financial status of children differs within families, 
Proposition  8:  Suppose  a = it = 0,  harents  face 
litarian constraints.  Then  Rd = 
it is important  to qualify Proposition  8 in the  following way. 
The  previous models  yielded Ticardia equivalence  (or approxirnat 
equivalence) for all transfers involving  a parent and his children, 
Here,  that is not the case,  Policies that entail differential treatment 
of children within the same family y  well have real effects, since the 
egalitarian constraint prevents parents from offsetting such redistri— 
butions, 
This observation  leads  naturally into our next result.  Just as 
the  equal  division requirement prevents parents from offsetting 
redistributions  within  the  family,  it precludes  private individuals from 
offsetting more complex transfer policies.  Suppose for example that the 
government taxes  parent  p.,  and distributes the  procedes to P. 
In 
the absence of elitarianism, p.  will decrease  t  by the amount of 
his incremental  tax, and  p1+1 
will raise T1 by his incremental 
subsidy.  In the presence of an elitar1an  constraint, these 
alternatives are proscribed.  Instead, the actual  responses  of  p 
and 
p11  will offset  the policy  only  partially. 
Accordingly, one  might well  suspect  that egalitarianism introduces —27— 
a kind of friction,  which attenuates the effects  of a perturbation as 
one  moves  further  from its source.  In large populations,  one  might  once 
ain find that policies  of iritragenerational redistribution  lead to 
sensible consequences.  Taking  limits of the  formulas in theorem  6  (and 
recalling  that,  with symmetric  endowments,  k  and  the equilibrium 
allocation  are independent of  N),  we obtain 
dC* 
1  — 
dW 




=  l3kI(  +  X)(1 - )_1  for  j  k 
As  expected, the effect of  p.'s  wealth on  p's  consumption declines 
geometrically as  j  becomes  "distant"  from  i.  However, the most 
striking feature of these formulas follows from the fact that  X  is 
negative.  Accordingly, a windfall for parent  p.  raises the 
consumption of  p.  (i  j)  when  i  —  j  is odd, and lowers  it when 
i  —  j  is even (see figure 3). 
A moment's reflection suggests  that this pattern is quite natural. 
In response  to an infusion of wealth, parent  p1  increases both his 
consumption  and  his transfers.  Upon  seeing  that one child  (k.,k+1) 
is better off,  parents  p,1 
and  p÷ 
choose to consume more and 
transfer less.  As  a  result,  the  resources of children  k.  and  k.  i—i  i+2 
fall.  Parents p2  and  p.2  respond by choosing to consume less, 
and transfer more.  The pattern then repeats. 
From these results it is easy to establish the  relevance of —28— 
intragenerational redistributions  in large  econornies  In fact, parent 
p  will respend  to  a transfer funded  from  general  revenues  (rn  )  just  1 
as  he would to an injection of new wealth;  furthermore, the  pure wealth 
affect does not anish  as the  population  grows 
2Etion9: Suppose  a =  = 0,  and that parents face 
tarian  constraints,  Let initial endowments  be  distributed 
dC  dC  rn 
symmetrically.  Then  lim  ho --  >  0,  and  Urn 8  >  1. 
-  N  'i  N- 
This result  has one  rather peculiar implication, which is that an 
intragenerational transfer has a  larger  redistributive effect on 
consurrtion if there are egalitarian  intergenerational transfers, than 
if there are no private transfers  at all (i.e.  R'  >  1).  That is, 
contrary to the implications of previous  analyses, private transfers 
serve  to magnify rather than dampen the  redistributive effects of 
government policies, 
Even so,  it might appear that egalitarianism provides the  ideal 
resolution to the paradoxes raised by Bernheim and Eagwehl.  After all, 
one obtains exact Ricardian equivalence without assuming that this 
source  of friction is small.  In contrast to previous sections, one need 
not pass to o  limits simultaneously, thereby producing a paradoxical 
wealth  effect. 
Yet this conclusion is premature, for the  imposition of egalita- 
rianism produces a paradox of its own.  Specifically, consider the 
welfare effects of an exogenous increase  in the wealth of some 
consumer.  Ordinarily,  we  would think  of this occurrence as -29- 
unambiguously desirable.  Not so within the context of the current 
rnodelr  Indeed,  roughly speaking, only one half of the population would 
benefit, while the other half would lose.  Formally, 
Proposition 10:  Suppose  =  =  0,  and that parents face 
egalitarian constraints.  Let initial endowments be distributed 
symmetrically. 
a)  If  N  is even and  3  1, then 
dtj/dW1 
<  0  1ff  3  is odd. 
b)  If  N  is odd and  I  niin(j,  N —  3 ÷  2) < N/2, then 
- 
dU/dW1 
< 0  111  min(j, N — 
3  +  2)  is odd. 
Thus,  an exogenous increase in the  wealth of any given consumer is 
never a Pareto improvement.  The intuition for this result follows 
directly from our discussion of figure 3; if parents  j 
—  1  and  3  ÷ 1 
consume more (and,  accordingly, give less to their children), then the 
resources of js  family have declined,  and  3  crust  be worse off even 
after adjusting his own behavior optimally. 
The reader may well feel that the implications  of Proposition  10, 
while surprising,  are not obviously counterfactual.  We do not deny 
this.  We  merely note that one cannot  accept the  egalitarian framework 
without reexamining the validity  of some very basic premises, and 
abandoning most simple  guides  to welfare  analysis. 
7.  Closing Reirks 
In  closing, it is important to emphasize  that we have  conducted 
this analysis in a way that is likely to significantly overstate the 
plausibility of approximately Ricardiari worlds.  More generally, the —30— 
case for Ricardian equivalence is even less compelling for two reasons. 
First,  our model spans only two generations.  While it is 
therefore adequate for analyzing the effects of deferring taxes  to the 
next generation, it is unsuited for drawing inferences about the impact 
of longer term debt,  Just as friction compounds through successive 
linkages between families, it will also compound as intergenerational 
chains lengthen.  Accordingly, in a more general model, we would expect 
to find that relatively temporary  deficits are approxirrately  neutral, 
while relatively permanent ones are not. 
- 
Second,  intrafamily linkages are actually  much more  complicated 
than  the network  modelled  here.  As  we  extend consideration to a  larger 
number  of generations, we  generate  a  proliferation  of paths  linking 
different members  of  the  same  generation  (see  Bernheim and  gwell, 
section 4,  for a  detailed discussion).  Linkages  actually  fora a  "web", 
rather than  the circle illustrated in figure 1  As  a result,  the 
"distance" between  two arbitrarily  selected individuals  may  be quite 
small  on average,  even when the population is quite large.  Suppose,  for 
example,  that we add one more generation,  meintaining our assumption 
that every parent  has  two  children,  and every child  two  parents.  Then, 
ioring redundancies (i.e.,  sibling don't have the same in—laws),  each 
grandparent  is directly linked through his grandchildren to 10 other 
grandparents, who are in turn linked to 10 others, and so forth.  This 
suggests that each  household is connected through chains involving  L 
or fewer links to on the order of  other households, rather than to 
only  2L  households, as in the current model.  Formal analysis of —31— 
random graphs indicates that this intuition is essentially correct (see 
Bollabas [1981]). 
These observation suggest that,  in a more realistic model, the 
Bernheim—Bagwell  puzzles would be much more roixist.  If most individuals 
are connected through relatively  few links, then it may be very 
difficult to eliminate the approximate neutrality of intragenerational 
transfers without assuming  a  or  it  very  large.  Similarly, each 
individual would in such a world have  a tremendous  number of "close" 
relatives so that,  once agedn, the marginal propensity to consume out of 
own wealth might be extremely small in the absence of large  friction. 
Overall, it is very difficult to see how one could introduce just 
enough friction in a model with a realistic pattern of  interfamily 
linkages to produce  approximate Ricardian equivalence without also 
generating  untenable results as in Bernheim and  Sagwell.  Jhile  one  can, 
perhaps,  avoid these  problems  by  invoking  an egalitarian  constraint, 
this alternative  seems  very  ad hoc,  and in addition generates  some 
disturbing welfare results.  Conseqntly, the theoretical  case for 
Ricardian  equivalence remains tenuous at best. xA 
Complete Comparative  Statics for Joy of Giving 
and Incomplete InfornEtion  Models 
This appendix presents the  comparative  statics analysis of a model 
that nests the joy of giving model in Section 4 and  the incomplete 
inforn'tion model in Section 5.  Recall  that 
C.  = consurrtion of adult i 
= consumption  of child i 
- 
= wealth of adult i 
= wealth  of child i 
= transfer  from adult i  to child i 
= transfer  from adult i  to child i + 1. 
Also recall that 
(Al)  C. = W.  — T.  t.  1  1  1  1 
Let y denote the consumption of child i if he receives transfers from 
adults  i  and  i — 1, 
(A2)  =  +  T.  +  t1_1 
Let 
(A3)  Z.  = w1 
+ T. 
(A4)  z1 
=  +  t. 
where  is a  dummy variable.  In particular, if  = 0,  then  Z is 
the transfer from adult  i  to child  i and  z  is the  transfer from —33— 
adult  I  to child  i + 1.  Alternatively, if  1,  then  Z is the 
consumption of child  i  if he does not receive a transfer from adult 
I  — 1;  z.  is the consumption of child  I + 1  if he does not receive a 
transfer from  adult  i + 1. 
Now suppose that adult  i  chooses  T1  and  t  to rrexiniize 
(A5)  u(C.) +  L[u(y.)  u(y.1)J 
+  w(Z)  + w(zjj 
The equations (Al  — A) contain both  the  joy of giving model and the 
incomplete inforrration  model.  To obtain the  joy of giving model, set 
p  , ii  =  a,  = 0  and  w() = v().  Alternatively, to obtain the 
private information model, set  p = (i  —  it), r = sit,  =  1,  and 
=  u(). 
The  first—order  conditions  are  obtained by  substituting (Al  —  A4) 
into (A5)  and  differentiating with respect to  T1  and  t1: 
(A6a)  (T.)  —u'(C.)  +  u'(y.) ÷  nw'(Z.)  =  0 
(A6b)  (t.)  _ut(C)  ÷  pu'(y  +  T1w'(z.)  = 0 
Now  totally differentiate the first—order conditions  with respect to 
T.,  t.,  W  and  w.  to obtain 
1  1  i  1 
(A7a)  —u"(C.)[dW. 
—  dT.  —  dtij 
+  u'(y.)[dw1 
+ dT +  dt.1J 
+  T)W"(Z4)[dW7 + 
dT1J 
=  0 
(A7b)  —u"(C.)[dW. 
— 
dT1 
— dtj +  u"(y.  1)[dw.  1 
+  dT.1 
+ dtj 
+  w"(z. )[dw.  +  dt1J 
=  0 —34— 
e assume that initially  W.  = W  and  W1 
=  W  for  all  i, and we 
restrict our attention to syametric equilibria.  Let 
a 5 u"(C,) + u"(y.) + nw"(z.)  < 0 
b a u"(C.) < 0 
e  xu(y.)  0 
f 5 w"(z.)  0 
and observe that  a = b  + e  + f < 0.  Using the  definitions of a  b, e 
and  f  we can rewrite (A7a,  b) as 
(ABa)  a dT.  + b  dt,  + a  dt.  = b  dU.  — (e  + f)dw.  1  1  i—I  1  1 
(A8b)  b dT.  + a  dt.  + e  dT.  = b  dW,  — (e  ÷ f)dw. 
1  1  i+1  1  i+1 
Let x•  be a 2  1  column vector such that x  = [dT,,  dt].  The linear 
1  1  1  1 
difference equation system in (A8)  can be written as 
ra  bi  r o  —e1  [b 
dW1  — (e  + f)dw1 
(A.9)  1[x] 
= 
1  1  [x.] + 
Le  0]  L—b  —a] 
1  b  dW.1 
— (e  + f)dw. 
Now observe that 
(Alo) 
[:  :r=[;  J —35— 
and  then pre—multiply both sides of (A9)  by the  rratrix on the  right—hand 
side of (MO)  to obtain 
x.=Mx.  +g, 
3  3—1  3 
where 
b  _a  e  e 
2 
a  e  a 
+  e  b  be 
and 
PdW.  - (i +—)dw.  e  j—l  e 
g 
= 
LdW. -  dW.1  - i)(e 
+ f) 
The  behavior of  x. =  [dT.,  dt.J  is governed by the  linear difference 
3  3  3 
equation  in (All)  and the boundary condition that 
= 
MxN 
The boundary condition in (A12)  exploits the fact that the N adults 
are located around a circle and adult  I  is formally the same as adult 
N +  1. 
For the purposes of our analysis, it is sufficient to allow 
and  g2  to be nonzero and to restrict  8.  0  for  j = 3,4,5,..., N. 
In this case, it follows from (All)  and  (A12)  that 
2 
= M  + 
Mg1  + 
g2 —36— 
and 
(A14)  xN 
= MN2X2 
Substituting (A14)  into (A13)  yields an expression for  in terms of 
the exogenous changes  g1  and 
(A15)  = (I — MN)  1{Mg1 
÷ 
g2] 
Using the boundary condition in (A12),  the expression for  x2  in(A15) 
and the fact that  x. = N3  for  j = 2,,.. ,N  we have a complete 
solution for  x1,.  ...,XN. 
N—i  N—i 
(A16a)  x1 
= M  (I — N  )  [Mg1 
+  g2] 
+ 
(A16b)  x. = M2(I - MN)  1[Mg1 
+ g2] 
;  j  2,..  .,N 
Let  <  be the  two characteristic  roots of the rtrix N.  Observe 
that 
(A17a)  +  = tr M =  a  -  - e2  > 
(A17b)  = det M =  1 
It follows from (A17b) that  and  are reciprocals of  each 
other.  Let  X  denote the smaller root  X1. 
It follows from (A17a) 
that both  roots,  X  and  are positive. 
It can  be directly verified  that the ntrix N can be written as 
(A18a)  N  =  PAP1 —37— 
where 
1  1 
(A18b)  p =  I 
1 
L  (b÷eX)  —  (b÷eX1) 
k  0 




+ eX)  -a 
(Alad)  = 
—  ?  )  (b + eX)  a 
Now observe that 
j—2  N  —1  j—2  N  —1  —1  (k19)  N  (I  —  N  )  =  PA  (I 
—  A  ) 
Substituting (AlSb)  and  (AlBc)  into (A19)  yields 
r  -2 
(A2o)  M2(I - MN)I  = 
1 
I  — 
'(b+eX)X2  (b+eX_1)X(2) 
We  are now prepared to analyze two comparative  statics 
exercises.  First,  we examine the effects of an increase in the  wealth 
of parent 1.  In particular,  we let  dW1 
> 0  and 
dW  =. .  .  =dW  =dw =. .  .=dw  =0.  Inthiscasewehave  2  n  1  N 
(A21a)  g1  [] 
dW1 —38— 
r  a  I 
g2=1  JdW1 
L e 
and 
r  b-a 
I  e 




dW1  12  2 
a  —e  —ab 
L  be  J 








b — a 
+ A  +  La 
New  cbserve  that 
b-a -  (b 
— a)C + a(X  +  b  +  a) — 
(A24)  F{Ng1+g2] 
= 




e(A_X)L(b+)  (b—a)X+a(X+C1)  I  a 
Observe  frcm (A17a)  that 
—1 
(A25)  (b  +  a)(b - a)/a  = —bR  +  A  ) - a 
Substituting (A25)  into  (A24)  yields 




dW1  (A26)  2[Mg1  +  g2 
= 
A  —  A1 [ 
b—a —1 
a  J 
&  —1 —39— 
Pre—multiply  (A26) by (A20) and use (A16b)  to obtain 
N 
_1)_1 
j—2  N—+2  b—a  j—l  N_÷l)  —  x .=1—?  )  —  + x  —  (x  ÷  x 
r 
e 
(A27)  I  1  b-a XJ 
[ 
L(b + eX)(1 + 
—1  b—a—1 N 
+  (b  + e  )(1  +  e 
To simplify  (A27)  recall that  the roots  = X  and  =  satisfy the 
characteristic  equation  — tr  N  +  det  0 whicn  can be written as 
I  I 
2  2  2  2 
(A28)  beX  = (a  — b  — e  — be 
I  i 
Now observe  that 
b_a 1{( 
2  2  2 
(A29)(b + eX  )(i +  = —  be  - ae)X,  + (e  +  b  —  ab)X  + be}  I  e  i  e  1 
Substituting  (A28)  into the right—hand  side of (A29) yields 
(A30)  (b  eX )(i +  —  a  _aX.L+X,  i=1,2  1  a  i 
— 
1  e  j 
Substituting  (A30) into (A27) yields 
k  +X  +  e  (1  — XN)l(x — k1)1 
[ 
3-2  N—j+2  b—a 
+ 
dW  (A31) 
+ XN_3  b - a (X1  N_+1)  +  e 
I = 2,... To  calculate  x1,  observe from (A12) and  (A14)  ttat 
x1 
= 1N_l  +  g. 
Formally, xi  can be written as  XN1 
+  where  = 
(O,dW1). 
Therefore 
Equation (A34) can be  rearranged to yield 
(A3  5) 
N—i—i  x.=PA  (I—A)  P 
N—i  b—a  N 
+  (X  +1)1  e 
dW1  N-i  b — a 
(XN + l)J  +x  + 
e 
2 
—a  +ae  I  b+e  + 
P1g 
1+—  r  b  I 
— 
—  e 
1  e(  - h_i)  2 
dw1 
a  —ae 
b 
—  =  N_1 
(A32) 
Now we consider the alternative exercise of increasing the  wealth 
of child 1-  by  dw1 
> 0.- In this case 
(A33)  = 1  + ) 




=  =  =  0. 
In this case, x. = M2(I — MN)  iMg1 
which can be written as 
(A34)  x. = PA2(I — 
AN)P_1FAP_1g1 
j  = 2,., .,N 
It follows from (Aied) and (A33) that 
(A3  6) —41— 
2  2-b2-ae  -a  + ae  a 
Now observe that  eX. +  b  +  = ek  —  so  that in 
b  I  b 
light of (A17a), 
2  2 
(A37)  eX, + 
—a  + ae  = e{X  — (  +  X  ) 
—  e  —  set  +  b  I  j  j  be 
Simplifying  (A'7) yields 
2 
A38)  eX. + b —  a  —  ae = e{-X. +  b 
Recalling  tnat X  =  X  and X2  H,  we  can  use  (A38) to rewrite  (A36) as 
a—e  — X 
e 





Now  use  (A19),  A2O),  A35) and  (A39) to obtain 
N—i  —i—iT  —i  a—e —1  ';_÷ii 
+ —)(i  — X  )  (k  — X 
)  r  —(X  + X  j  +  (X 
+ X  )  e 
(Mo)  1  - at 
4 eX)1  -  lj_1 
L 
(b  + eX)[  - X1 
j =2,...,N. 
To simplify (MO)  observe  that 
(A41)  (b + ek )(a 
—  e 
—  x.) = {ab 
—  be  #  (me  —  e2  b2  —  beX  I 
Substituting  (A28) into (Ml) yields 
(A42)  (b+eX.)(a_e_X)=a(l  eaX)  i  b  1 
+  b  i —42— 
Substituting  (A42) into (A4O) yields 
=  +  —  -  + 
(A43)  dw 
+ 
j = 2,...  ,N. 
To  calculate  x1, note that forrrelly  x1 
=  +  g1.  Using  (A43) and 
(P33) we obtain 
-  - 
- 
=  (i +  i  N)-l(  1)1 (x 
+xNi)  (1  + 
(A44)  dw1 
L1 
+  XN)  +  (x  + 
Appendix  B 
Egalitarieni am 
This appendix presents  the oompantive statics analysis  of  the 
economy in whioh all parents divide  their estates equally among  their 
ohildren.  Recall  that 
=  consumption of adult  i 
ci 
= consumption of child  i 
= wealth  of adult  i 
= wealth  of child  i 
= transfer  from  parent  i  to  child  i, which  equals  transfer 
from parent i to child  i  +  1. 
Observe that 
(31)  c.  = w. — 2'T. 
1  1  1 -43- 
and 
(32)  csw +T1  +Ti_i 
Parent i chooses Ti to .mximize 
(33)  u(ci; 
+ $u(o) 
+ 
and the first-orGer condition for tots razisization problem is 




Totally differentiating this first—order  condition  with respect  to  Ti. 
and  Wj  yields 
_2u*(Ci)(dwi 
—  2dTi] + uM(ci)(dvi  d''i +  dTii] 
(35)  t Pu"(ci+i)(dwi+i 
+ 
dTi + 
We assume  that initially  '¼ 
—  W  and  Vi — "  for all  i, and  we 
restrict  our attention to syrntrio equilibria.  Let 
a  4u(Ci) +  2Pu"(oi) < 
b ! 
2u"(Ci) < o 
e  s $u(oi) 
< 
and  observe  that  a  —  2(b  + e).  Using the definitions of  a, b, and  e, 
we  oem write  (35) as 
e dT,1 +  a dTi 
+ e dTi+i 
—  b Si 
—  e  — e  (86) —44- 
The second—order linear  difference equation  in  (BE) can  be  written 
in companion  form  by defining the  2  X  1  column vector  as 
x.  =  [dT.,  dT.1]  Therefore, 
x.  = Mx.  + h.  I  = 2,...,N  1  i—i  1 
where 
—1 
e  L1 o 
h.  = [ 
dW.1 
—  (dw1 + 
dwj1 




The boundary condition in (Be) reflects  the  fact that formally adult  1 
may be represented as adult  N + 1. 
For  the purposes of our analysis, it is sufficient to allow  h1 
and  h2  to be nonzero and to restrict  h  = 0  for i = 3,4,5,...  ,N.  ifl 
this case, it follows from (B7) and  (Be)  that 
N—2 
x  =M  x 
2 
= .M  XN 
+  + x. = M2x2 for  j  =  2,...  ,N, we can use  — B1) 
solution for 
N—i  N  1r  ='4  (I—N)  L1+h2i4h1 
i—2  N—i  =  (: 
—  M  /  [Nn 
+ h2j  i  = 2,  .  .  .  N 
Let  ) A2  be  the  two  ccaracteristic  roots  of  the catrjx '4. 
Observe  that 
(Bt2a)  +  '2 
tr K = —  <  —2 
(312b)  i  2 
= bet  '4  = 
It follows from (Bi2bj that the 
Let  k  be the larger root 
(Bi2a) that  < -i  <  < 0. 
It can be directly verified  that  the riatrix  '4  can  be written as 
'4  =  PAPi  (Bi  a) 
where 
ii 
rx  0 
A = 
L  o 
—45— 
Using  the  fact that 
to obtain a complete 
(Blia) 
(Bitt)  x. 
roots are reciprocals of each other. 
therefore X  =  It follows from 
(B13b) 
(Bi  3c) —46— 
X  —1 
(213d)  = 
1 
— 
X  —  Lx  i- 
Now observe that 
1—2  N  —1  1—2  N  —1  —1 
(B14)  N  (I—N)  =PA  (i—A) 
Substituting (213b, c, d)  into (214)  and performing the trix 
multiplication yields 
i—2 -  N—i  N —1.  —1—1  Ei—i  N—i÷i  .i—2  N—i+2 I  N  (I—N  )  =  (i—h  )  (—X  )  I 
-  —(h.  ÷X  ) 
(215) 
I  i-2  N-i+2  .1-3  N-i-3  —(  ÷  ) 
We  are now prepared to analyze two comparative  statics exercises. 
First, we examine the effects of an increase in the wealth of adult 1. 
In particular, let 
dW1 
> 0  and 
dW2 







0  rb/e)dw, 
In this case  h1 
= [  j 
and  h2 
= L  o  }  It follows from (Sub) 
and (215)  that 
x.  =  (1  — xN)( — T1)  (i_1  + XN  i+1) 
(816)  1  j  dW  I  = 2,... 
I  b  1—2  N—i+2 
Therefore, 
(217) 
1  =  b 
(1 — XN)_i(x - x1)1['1  +  ?N_i+i] -47— 
i = 
Now consider the alternative exercise of increasing the wealtn 
of child 1.  In particular,  let 
dw1 
> 0  and  dw2 
=  = 
dw,  dW1  = 
.=dWN=O.  Inthiscase,n1Ll 0J dw1 
and 
h2 
=  [—1  oP  dw1, 





L  j 
dw1 
It follows from  (bllbP (015)  and (810)  that 
N,  —1  —1  —1  a  - e  i-i  N—i÷1  i—2  N-i+2,' 
x.  =  (1—X  )  (k—.  )  (.  ,i  +  (X  + .  ) 
a  e (X12  1Oi+2)  + (Xi_3  + 
i  = 2,  ,  N 
Therefore, 
- 
a  —  e  i—i  N—i+1  i—2  N—i+2  r.  e  +k  )+,,?  +X  ) 
1  1  - kN)(X  - _1) 
1=1,., —48— 
Appendix C 
Theorem  1:  Let  S.  = {(T,t)jT + t K W.  and  T, t  > o}.  S.  is 
1  —  1  = 
p's  strategy space; let 
S1 
denote an element of  S4.  Note that  S 
is compact and convex,  Further, p's  utility  is by assumption 
continuous in  a = (sl,...,sN), 
and (it is easy to verify) quasi—concave 
in  s..  Thus, by Debreu's {1952]  Social Equilibrium Existence Theorem, 
there exists a profile of strategies  (s,...  ,s)  which satisfies our 
definition c  equilibrium.  Q.E.D. 
* 
Theorem  2:  In a symrrtric equilibrium with transfer level  T 
* 
(T  ,T  j  must  satisfy 
sax u(W  —  T  —  t)  + {(i — m)[u(w + T +  T)  +  u(w  +  t + T)) 
T,t 
+ m{u(w + T)  + u(w  + t)j} + a[v(T)  + v(t)] 
subject to  T  >  0, t > 0, and  T + t < W.  5y concavity of  u  and  v, 
we  know  that the  solution always entails  T  =  t,  so  we  simply  require 
* 
that  T  solves 
sax u(W — 2T)  +  2{(1  — m)u(w + T + T) +  mu(w  + T)}  + 2v(T) 
T 
subject to  U < T K W/2.  Let  y:  [0,W/2] - 0,W/2]  be defined as 
y(T) = arg  max u(W — Zr)  +  2[(1  — lt)u(w  + T + T)  + mu(w -4-  T)}  + 2av(T) 
O<T<W/2 
Since this objective function is continuous and strictly concave, 
y  is a continuous fumction.  By the intermediate value theorem, there —49— 
*  *  * 
exists  T  such that  T  = y(T  ), as required.  Finally, note that  the 
* 
equilibrium condition is independent of  N,  so  T  recains a symmetric 
equilibrium independent of  N. 
Theorem 3  For any BNE  (T,t.)1, let 
0  c  =W  —t.  1  1  1  1 
=  w.  ÷ T.  ÷  t. 
1  1  1  i—i 
That is, C  is p's  consumption contingent upon  p.  being altruistic, 
and  C.  is  KS  consumption contingent JDOn  p.  and  p.  being  1  1  1  i—I 
0  oN 
altruistic.  We will first establish trat  (C.,c.).  must be identical 
1  1 i=1 
in all  SNE. 
Suppose  this claim is false.  Then there are two SNE  which give 
•  —o —o N  N 
rise to distinct profiles  L,c.).  and  (C,c.). 
.  Without  loss 
1  1  i=1  1  1  i=1 
of generality, we tray  suppose that either  >  or  > c for 
some  j. 
Take first the case of  > C.  Through  p's  budget constraint, 
we see that either  T,  K T., or  t. K t,  Without loss of generality, 
we assume  t. K t,. 
Now we use induction.  Suppose that for some  i > 0,  > Ci, 
and  t.  K  t.  ..  Since  it must then be the case that  t.  .  >  0, we 
3+1.  3+1  3+1 
have 
u'(C°  )  < (1 — t)u'(C  •  )  + mu'(w.  + t.  .)  * av'(t.  •) 
j+i 
—  3+1+1  3+1  3+1 
(inequality  mey occur if  C.=  0).  Now we are that  ) —50— 
For suppose not.  Using strict concavity of  u  and  v, along with 
C..>  C.  and  t.  < t  .,  wewouidhave 
3+1  3+1  j+i  j+l 
u'(?.) < (i — s)u'G?1) 
+ u'(w.1 
+  + 
But  this implies that  could increase his utility by transfering 
more  to  Ic.  ,  which  is a contradiction. 
3+1+1 
Next,  since  t.  .  <  t.  and  c?  > o?  ,  then,  from 
3+1  3+1  3+1+1  3+1+1 
Ic.  'a budget constraint, we must have  T.  > T.  .  Since  it 
3+1+1 
-  -  3+2+1  3+1+1 
- 
must  then be the case that  T.  > C, we have 
3+1+1  - 
- 
—0  /  \  —0  —  /  u'(C.  -  ) < (1 — lt)u'(c.  .  )  + su'(w,  .  +  T,  .  )  + cv'T. 
3+1+1 
—  3+1+1  3++1  3+1+1 
Now we argue that  C?  > C? .  .  For  suppose not.  Using strict 
3+1+1  3+1+1 
concavity of  u  and  v,  along with  c?  .  >  c? .  and  T.  .  >  T  -  * 
3+1+1  3+1+1  3+1+1  3+1+1 
we  would have 
u'(C?  .  )  <  (1 — a)u'(c?  .  )  + au'(w.  .  + T.  .  )  + av'(T. 
3+1+1  3+1+1  3+1+1  3+1+1  3+1÷1 
But  this implies  +i+1  could  increase his utility by transferring 
more to  Ic.  .  ;  which is a contradiction. 
3+1+1 
—  —o 
Finally,  if  T.  .  >  T.  .  and  C.  .  >  C.  .  ,  then by  P.  . 
j+i+1  j+i+1  3+1+1  3+1+1  3+1+1 
budget constraint, t.  .  <  t.  .  This completes the induction step. 
3+1+1  3+1+1 
Note that induction implies  c? > C 
and  ?  > c 
for all  i. 
This violates the aggrete  budget constraint.  Accordingly, we have a 
contradiction for the first case. 
Now turn to the  second case  (c? > c?  for some  j).  By  k's 
3  3  3 —51— 
budget constraint,  either  T.  >  T, or  >  t. .  Witnout loss of 
3  3  3—  'J— 
assume  T.  >  T..  We  have  already  demonstrated above  that 
c.  >  c.  and  T.  >  I,  implies  C.  > C  This returns  us  to  the first 
3  3  3  3  3  3 
case,  which yields  a  contradiction. 
The  preceding argument  suffices  to establish that if  m  3  and 
it  =  0,  all BNE yield the same  allocation  of  consumption.  Now  suppose 
that  >  0  or  it >  0.  Let  denote the unique BNE 
1  1 i1 
consumption profile. 
Suppose  first that  0°  >  0  for some  j.  Then either (i) T  >  0 
and 
u'(C)  — it)u'(c) + Bitu'(w.  +  T.)  + av'(T.) 
or (ii)  T,  =  0  and 
u'(C) > (i - it)u'(c) ÷ cu'(w,)  +  sv'(O)  3—  3 
By  strict concavity of  u  and  v, only one  of these conditions can 
hold;  furthermore, (i)  can  hold for at most one value of  T..  Thus, T. 
3  3 
is  uniquely determined.  We obtain  t.  from  p's budget constraint. 
Now procede by induction.  Suppose we know  t.  Then we obtain  T1 
from  k  's budget constraint.  Knowing  T  ,  we  can  calculate  t 
m+1  m+1  m+1 
from  p1ts budget constraint.  Applying induction, we conclude that 
all transfers are uniquely  determined. 
Next,  suppose  that  C =  0  for all  j.  Consider any  i.  Since 
T.  + t.  =  W.,  either  (i)  0 <  T.  <  W.  and 
1  1  1  1  1 
(1  — lt)u'(c?)  +  mu'(w.  +  T.)  +  sv'(T.)  =  (1  - lt)u'(c?1) 
+ 
i+1  I  I 
—  I  I  +ltu'(w  +W  —T  )  ÷v'(W  —T  ) —52— 
or  (ii)  T.  = 0  and 
(1 
—  +  u'(w.)  + av'(O) < (1 —  + 
+ Ttu'(w.  + w) +  av'(W)  1  1 
or  (iii)  T.  = W.  and 
1  1 
(1 — 5)u'(c)  +  u'(w.  + w.) + av(W.)  >  (1 —  + 
+ u'(w.1)- + v'(0) 
By strict concavity of  u  and  -v,  only one of these three conditions 
can hold;  furthermore, (i)  can  hold for at most one value  of  T. 
1 
Thus,  T.  is unicuely determined for each  i, as is  t.  (t.  =  T). 
1  1  1  1 
Q.E.D. 
Proofs of Propositions 1,  2, and 3 were  given in the text. 
Theorem 4:  The formula for  X + X  follows directly from 
substitution into (A17a).  Without loss of generality, take  k = 1. 
Then from (A32), 





dW  dW 
= 1  - 2(1  xN1(  -  +  (1  + ;)(1 
+ XN\ 
=  1  — 2(1  — XN)lx —  + xN_1  (1  + XN)(x + 
- (i +  - (X +  x1)/2)(1 + 
= 1  — 2(1  — X)1(k  —  —  + —53— 
+  (av'(Ti +  [vu(T)1  ÷ 
u'(C)  2u(C)u(c)' 
=  1  - 2(1  — N)_1(x  — 1)_1[(j — kN)( - 
cv'(T)  I  av"Tj  N  +  f  M+.  (i ÷)  u"(c) 
N.  /  - N—1  —1  —1  mv"(T)  ______  1  +  )1 - A  )  ( 
—  + 
as  desired.  From (A31). we have 
dC.  dT  dt.  -- ---- 
dW  - 
dU1  dW1 
N  —1  -  —1  —1 -, j  —2  N—  +2  N—  = i 
—  A  )  (A 
—  X)  A  +  4-  + 
(  v"(T)  j—1  -  —  + u"(c) 
+  A 
=  (1  - XN)_l(kl  -  ÷  * 2(1  + )j(k3_1 
÷ 
= (x  + 4-1)(1 - )1(x1 -  2 + av\ 
Finally,  note that the  labelling of parents is arbitrary, so  that we  can 
always  relabel to make any given parent  p1, and either of the parents 
with  whom he shares his children  P2  Relabelling produces the desired 
formula. 
Proposition 4:  By Theorems 2 and 3, for  all symmetric endowment 
levels  w  and  W, the unique equilibrium  is symzretric.  It can 
therefore  be characterized by the first order condition 
u'(C) — u'(w  ÷  - C)  — avl(W_—_C) = o —54— 
Since  u  and  v  are concave, the equilibrium value of  C  is also the 
solution to 
W-C 
sax  u(C1  ÷ u(w  + W  — C)  + 2av(  ) 
0<c<W 
(note that this yields (Ci)  as the first order condition).  Since this 
problem satisfies all the hypotheses of the maximum theorem, its 
solution is continuous in  a.  Let  C°  denote the equilibrium value for 
a =0 (by assumption  0  < C°< W);  let  C°  w  ÷W  — C°  and 
= (w - c°)/2. 
From  (Ci), it follows that 
dC  v"(T) 
= 
u"(C)  +  u"(c)  +  v(T) 
0  0  o 
Letting  a  0  and  noting that  C  +  C  ,  c -  c  ,  and  T + T  with 
C°,  c0,  T° >  C, we  immediately  have  ha  = 0,  Since  c  = w  +  W  —  C,  a0 
we also have  him  = 0.  Thus,  him R  =  0. 
aO  a0 
Next,  from Theorem 4 we have 
dC 
him  = urn  [(1 — XN)_  x_l  —  XY1a] 
a+0  I  a+0 
i—i  N—i÷i  v"(T)  jx  +  x 
u"(C)  2  + 
We  have written this as the limit of the product of two expressions. 
Since  urn ) = 1,  the limit of  the second expression is  4v'(T)/u'(C). 
a+0 
Note that this limit does  not  depend  upon  i.  Furthermore,  the  first —63— 
As in the proof of Theorem 4, relabelling produces the desired formula 
for the  derivatives with respect to 
Proposition 8:  Equilibrium is characterized by the set of first 
order conditions 
+ T.  +  ÷ &  (w.  + T.  TV)] = 2u(.  — 
1  i+1  I  i+1  i+1  1  1  1 
Implicitly differentiating these conditions with respect to  6  yields 
2u"(C.) + [u"(ci)  + u"(c.1)J 
dT.  dT  dT.  dT.  dT. 
1  C  i—i  is  1  i+1  =  4u'(C) — 
+  (cj( d6 
÷  +  u  c.1;(  dô 
There are  N  such equations in  N  unknowns (the  dT./do).  One can 






for all  i  satisfies these equations.  From this,  it is trivial to 
verify the desired result.  Q.E.D. 
Proposition 9 
dC.  dC. 
Part  1:  urn  = urn  > 0 
1  N-  I 
Recall that 
dO.  dC 
1 —  __i. 
L  dW.  dW 
1  1 —56-- 
Since the  right hand side is positive and finite, we have the desired 
conclusion.  Q.E.D. 
ition5 
*  1  Fart 1:  ha  R  = 
N÷ 
Without loss of generality, take 
him F 
1 
>  1, For any sequence  Nk 
+ 
N- 
positive integers  Mk + wi±h 
=-{i  1  < i  < N  or 
k  =  =  k 
K  = {i  1  1  <  < N 
k  =  =  k 
=  1,  First, we prove that 
choose another sequence of 
+ 0.  Define 
- 
N—N  +2Ci<N 
k  k  =  =  ic 
or  N  — N  + 3  <  < N 
k  k  =  =  k 
=  +  !'-l)/2 
dC,  do, 
-j/2 
+ 
i€E  1  aeK,  1 
k  K 
dC•  do. 
c'  1  \'  1  =  L  —+  L  — 




(where the final equality follows from 
aggregate consumption).  Noting that 
dO,  do,  -÷  iP  1  1 
the  fact that  '  does  not alter 
dC.  dC.  N  dO. 
1  1  v  /  \1  1 
d'v =dW 
—  L"  ) 
1  1  =2 
dO,  N  dO, 
=  (N — 1)'(N ' 
— 
1  31  3 
Note that -57— 
dC.  —l  i  dC1  —  I  L 
along with a  similar expression  for  and  using symmetry around  p, 
we  have 
dC  K  dC.  dc. 
2  >  - 1)N--- 
2 i=21 
+ 
—  2k 
—  2dW 
+  dW 
— 
M 
dC  k  dT.  dt.  dT.  dt, 
= N  - 1)1NL 
+ 2 i=21 
+  - (1  1 
- (2M,  - 2)  - 
d- 
= k  -  1)_i !Nk:! 
+  2  2  -  - 2)  - 
=  - 1)_i  N1  - 2  j  - 
(2Mk - 2)  - 
dt  dT 
where the last equality follows from the  fact that  =  and 
1  1 
C1 + 
T1 
+  = 
W1. 
Now  we take limits.  Recall that the  symmetric equilibrium 
allocation is independent of  N.  From (A1),  it is obvious that since 
dtM 
Mk 
+  and  N 
k 
N  +  as  k + , then  •  0  (given  0 K  <  i). 
Further  (Nk 
— 1)_i  + 0,  N(N 
-  +  1, and 
(Nk  111(Mk 
— 1)  + 0. 
We  are therefore left with  lj.m R  > 1, as  desired. —58— 
Now we argue that  urn 2  <  1. 
N' 
t  N  dC  do 
1  v  (  I  I  2  =  L  + 
1=1  1  1 
=  (N  1Y(N  —  ÷  IN  — 
<(N - i1  {N( I 
+  I) 
+  (II 
+ I  )}/ 
-  dC, 
- 
From  Theorem  4, it is clear that  > 0  for all  i,  It follows that 
do,  1 
> 0  for all  i, othen,'ise  the first order condition for some rent 
would be violated.  Furthermore, from the derivation in the proof of 
proposition 4, it is clear that  '  >  0  and  > 0.  Thus, 
< (N — 1r1N(  ÷1) 
+ N(  ÷)}/2 
= (N  — 1)N 
1 
From  this,  it is immediately clear that  lim F  <  1. 
dO,  dO. 
Part 2:  lim —'i- = lim  ''s' >  0. 
dm.  dW.  N-  1  N+o  1 
As before, without loss of generality, take  i  = 1.  We know that 
dO  dO 
— N  1\1rN __.i.  4c.i  —  —  L 
dW1  dW 
Since the symmetric equilibrium allocation is independent of  N, the 
second term disappears in the limit.  The first term converges to 
dO1 
as desired.  Finally, using Theorem 4, —59-. 
dC, 
= (1  - )1 
SVU(TL (2+ ) 
> 
Q.E.D. 
Proposition 6:  Fix any  a.  We ow  that li 
1  =  1,  so there 
exists  N  such that for all  N > Na 
— F  < a.  For each  , let 
N(s) = N  .  Consider 300e sequence  s ,N /  ÷  as  k  wftn  a  a  a 
N  > N(s  )  for all  a.  Then, for each  a,  I  -  F  K a  .  Since  k=  k 
0,  R  + I.  Further F0  is independent of  N,  so  Râ  0  follows 
from proposition 4. 
Proposition 7:  By Theorem 4, 
dO. 
= [(1  - xNl(1 - F)lv(T 
(2  )(i 
+ 






decreasing in  N 
(111)  lim  <  4 
sO  i 
Property (i)  IS straightforward to check.  Propeerty (ii)  follows from 
the fact that  (1 — XN)_1(l  + XN)  is  decreasing  in  N.  We establish 
property  (iii)  as follows. 
In the proof of proposition 4, we showed that —60.. 
urn  [(i  -  -  ['cj[4N  °-i 
aO  u'(C°) + u'(c°)  u(C°) 
Thus, 
hr  = [ -  ftuq°) 
[4N !iL]—1  [  v"(T°) 
dW. 
u'(C°) ÷ u"(c°)  ut(C°)  ut(C°) 
=  N1[ 
u"(c°) 
]  < 
u(C  )  + u'(c  ) 
Now  suppose  that  the propositionis  false Then  by property (ii, 
there  rnust exist a sequence  <akNk>kl  converging to  (0,)  such that 
1 
> i >  o 
for all  k.  By Proposition 3, we can without loss of generality take 
a  > 0  for all  k.  Choose  k*  such that 
— a 
for some  a > C.  Consider a subsequence  k  such that  N,  > N  for 
p  K  k 
p 




>  > N 
÷ a 
so 
dC1  1 
him 
dW  N,  ,a  N.÷ 
÷ a  * 
p-  1  k 
But this contradicts property (iii). —61— 
Theorem 5:  Each player's strategy set is the interval  [O,W/21 
(he chooses a transfer belonging to this interval).  Obviously, this is 
compact and convex.  Further, p's  utility is cor.tinuous,  and concave in 
T..  As in Theorem 1, we immediately have existence. 
Next, note that if we  have an equilibrium where  t.  = T,  for 
1  1 
all  i  without  imposing  this as  a  constraint,  this configuration 
relains an equilibrium  when the constraint is imposed,  since the effect 
of this is only  to  limit deviations.  Thus,  the existence  of a  symmetric 
equilibrium when endownnts  are symritric is giaranteed by  Theorem 2. 
Finally,  we  come  to uniqueness.  Throughout  our argument,  we  will 
refer to parents' first order  conditions, which,  for an interior 
solution,  can  be written as 
2u'(C.)  = (u'(c) + 
Now suppose, contrary to tne  theorem,  that  tnere are  two  distinct 
equilibria,  (T.)  and  (TY1  .  Then,  without loss of generality,  1 i=1  1  i=1 
there  exists some  i  for which  T.  > T.  By  P.'S budget constraint, 
C.  < C..  Inspection of  p.  '5 first order condition (recalling that  u 
1  1  1 
is strictly concave) reveals that either  c.  < c.,  or  0.1 
< 
01+1. 
Without loss of generality, assume the  latter.  Then by  k11's  budget 
constraint,  I'.  < T  ,  and  T. — T.  <  T.  — T. 
i+1  is1  1  1  i+i  i+i 
Now  we  procede  by  induction.  Suppose  first  that  m  is odd, 
T  <  T  ,  arid  c  <  c  .  Then,  by  p  'S budget constraint, 
i+m  i+m  i÷m  i-s-rn  i÷m 
C.  > C.  .  By  p.  's first order condition, c.  > c.  .  By  i+m  i÷rn  1+nl  i÷m+1  i÷÷1 
k.  's budget constraint, T.  > T.  ,  and  T.  —  T.  > 
i+m+i  i+m+1  1+m+1  i+m+i —62-- 
T,  I'. 
z+m  i+m 
Suppose  that  a  is even, I.  < T.  ,  and  c.  > c.  Then, by 
i+m  1+m  i+m  i÷m 
p.  's budget constraint  C.  ) C.  By  p  'S first order condition, 
14-rn  j.+rn  1+::: 
>  By  k  '5 budget constraint, T.  < T.  and 
i+m+-1  i÷rn+1  i+rn+1  i.+m=1  i+rn+1' 
T.  -T.  >T.  -T. 
i÷rn+1  i+m+1  11-rn  i+m 
Applying  induction, we see that 
-  >> . 
i÷m±1  1÷m+1  +m  i+m  1  1 
for all  rn.  taking  a  =  N  yields a contradiction. 
Theorem 6:  The  formula for  X + X  follows directly  from 
substitution into (B12a).  From (B17), we have 
dC1  dT1 
= 1  — 2 
= I  —  4  (1  -  —  X)1(1 + 
=  1  +  (X  +  +  2)(1  — N)_1/x  - Xl)(1 + 
=  1  —  (1  + X)(1  +  XN)(l 
— x)1(l — 
= —2X(1  + XN_1)(l - x)1(l  — 
as desired.  Also  from (517), 




= -  (1  - x1(x -  +  XN_i+1) 
_1  N  —1  —1  —1  —1  N—  +1 
=  (x + ?  + 2)(1 
—  ?)  (x — x  )  (x  + x 
=  —(1  +  X)(1  - XN)1(l  — )_1(_1  + XN_i+I) —64— 
Since the  distribution of endowments is symmetric before and after a 
change in  W,  the equal division constraint is not binding; thus, the 
formula for  dC/dW  is exactly as in the proof of Proposition 4 (taking 
a  = 0): 
dC 
= u"(c)[u'(C) + 
Since  0 <  <  1  and since  c  and  C  are independent of  N,  the 
limit of  (N — 1)  is  0.  Thus,  - 
dC.  dC  dC 
ha  = him (N — lr'N  = hIm 
N+  i  i  N÷  1 
From Theorem 6,  this last term equals  —2X(1 — X)1,  which is strictiy 
positive as desired. 
1  Part 2:  im  R  >  1 
For any  Nk 




as in the 
proof of Proposition 5.  Note  that 
a.  N  dC.  dc. 
R 
1  =  (I! 
+ 
1=1  1  1 
dO.  dc.  dC.  do. 
{  I]/2 
+ I  j—'- 




1  1  iKk 
I 
Consider some  C  satisfying  0 <  a <  —2X(1  - X)1.  By the argument in 
dC 
Part 1,  there exists  N1  such that for all  N > N1, —i  >  a.  By an 
argument similar  to that given-in Part 1, it is easy to show that —65— 
=  =  k(1  + X)(1  - X) (0 
Consider then some  n  satisfying  0 >  >  —X(1  + X)(i  — X)1.  There 
exists 
N2 
sucn that for all  N  > 
N2,  . Thus,  for 
N  > 
do.  dC,  do. 
1  1  1  1 
R  >  +  /  +  i  L  +  L  +  rran{,'1} 
— 
2k  iKk  i  'k 
1  ijK,  I 
Proceding exactly as in the proof of Proposition 5, it then follows that 
for  N  > 
naxN1,N2}, 
dT 
R1  k 
—  1)_i  Nk[l 
—  2  Nk — 
(2Mk -2) -  +  m1n{c,} 
dTM 
From  (B17), it is clear that  +  C  as  k + .  Thus, 
us  R 
1 
>  1  + min{s,n}  >  1.  Q.E.D. 
Proposition 10:  Note that 
= -(i 
—  XN)_l(k 
—  1)1(x +  x_I  + 2)( + 
First,  assume that  N  is even.  Then it is easy to check that 
dT./dW1 
is positive if and only if 
,j  is odd.  Now consider  p, with 
J *  1  odd.  Note that  dT.1/dW1 
< 0, and  dT.1/dW1 
< 0.  Recall that 




+ (u(w +  + 
T3_1) 
+ u(w +  + 
I 
This is strictly increasing in 
T1_1 
and  Tj+e 
Thus, p1s utility 
must declins as 
WI  tins.  We  reason analogously for  j  even. 
Nezt,assussthat  N  isodd.  Thsnitissasytocbsokthatif 
i—I  <N—(i—I),dT1/dW1>O iff  3  isodd.  Further, if 
N—(j—1)<j—I, then 
dT1/dW1>O  itt  N—i  isodd.  Accordingly, 
it  I * j < N/2  thsn  (j  + 1)  — I <  N  —  (Ci + I) — 1], and so 
dT1_1/dW1 and 
dT31/d%ç- ann.stivs itt- 1  isodd.  As above;  this  - 
implies that 
P1  is wons off  r ccnvsrsely it  3  is--svsn.  If,  en the 
otherhand,N—j+2<N/2,then  N—((j—I)—1]<(j—I)—I,and 
dT3_1/dW1  and 
4?1  1/dW  are nsptive itt  N  — j  is odd.  Lain, this 
implies  p1  is worse ottj ocnvensly it  N  — j  is nen.  Q.E.D. —67— 
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